As Executive Director of the Nonhuman Rights Project, Christopher founded both the Access to Justice program to develop the procedural infrastructure animals need to participate in legal proceedings, and the Freedom From Cruelty program whose first lawsuit on behalf of the Ridglan dogs argued that statutory anti-cruelty protections should be enforceable rights held by the dogs and puppies themselves. He also directed the amicus strategy behind a published decision recognizing a dog as "immediate family" for an emotional distress claim.
Previously at the Animal Legal Defense Fund, Christopher managed the successful effort to win a federal court's recognition of Colombia's cocaine hippos as "interested persons" entitled to seek witness testimony in the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. He also petitioned the NIH to recognize that human-animal chimeras may qualify as human research subjects entitled to federal protection.
Previously at the Animal Legal Defense Fund, Christopher managed the successful effort to win a federal court's recognition of Colombia's cocaine hippos as "interested persons" entitled to seek witness testimony in the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. He also petitioned the NIH to recognize that human-animal chimeras may qualify as human research subjects entitled to federal protection.
A thread connects this work: the jurisprudence of nonhuman legal status. How courts recognize, shape, and revise legal status categories is not unique to animals. In the past, judges led the way in recognizing corporations and ships as nonhuman persons. And now, courts are confronted with questions about the legal status of animals, nature, artificial intelligence, and technologically engineered beings like human-animal hybrids and brain organoids. AI represents an especially urgent case because legal status is a potential tool for safety—obligations on AI systems, vicarious liability for those who deploy them, and the capacity to enter and enforce contracts can all promote alignment and accountability.
Across all of these domains, Christopher argues that the legal system should tailor a nonhuman entity's status to the aims of justice rather than defaulting to the rigid binaries of person/property or human/nonhuman. How well the law manages that will be among the most consequential legal issues of the future.
Across all of these domains, Christopher argues that the legal system should tailor a nonhuman entity's status to the aims of justice rather than defaulting to the rigid binaries of person/property or human/nonhuman. How well the law manages that will be among the most consequential legal issues of the future.